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1.  Introduction 
Socio-Economics stands at the intersection between Economics, Sociology, and other 
social sciences. Its primary tenet is that markets are social institutions created by human 
societies for the purposes of exchange and productive enterprise. This chapter aims to give 
theoretical and empirical substance to this proposition in the field of employment, and this 
encompasses both the allocative function of labour markets, and the productive function of 
employment relationships. There is a perpetual tension between these two as the first tends 
towards treating labour services as commodities, whereas the team relationships of the latter 
militate against this. As Alfred Marshall maintained, the demand for labour is a derived 
demand, derived from its value in its different productive uses. As a result, relations of 
exchange and production spill over into each other, and this is reflected in the institutions and 
norms governing workers’ economic activity. Yet the impersonal relations of market 
exchange are often contrasted with the social relations of team production. Adam Smith’s two 
great works, his Wealth of Nations (1776), and his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), 
reflect the tension between our thinking on markets and on social ties, hence their treatment 
in two separate works, and the so-called ‘Adam Smith problem’. Nevertheless, he was 
acutely aware of the empirical interconnections between them. He was deeply pessimistic 
about the motivation of salaried managers in charge of joint stock companies, believing their 
‘negligence and profusion’ would bring ruin. He was more confident about the future of 
family firms whose leaders were often motivated beyond their personal gain by providing a 





The Economics Nobel Laureate Robert Solow captured the sentiment of many labour 
economists in the title of his 1990 lectures which described the labour market as a ‘social 
institution’. The puzzle that concerned him was why wages do not appear to behave like other 
prices, and fall in a recession. He was especially interested in why unemployed workers 
appear to follow a social norm that overrides their individual short-term interest, and so 
refrain from undercutting the wages of those in employment.
 
In similar vein, Truman Bewley 
(1999) reported the equally interesting finding that employers do not generally cut wages in a 
recession because of their concern about employee ‘morale’. From a different perspective, 
many economic sociologists observe that such norms play a key role in the workings of 
markets. Arthur Stinchcombe (1986) argues that markets use norms of exchange ‘to see to it 
that [people] get want they want’ out of transactions. Mark Granovetter (1974, 1985) argues 
that markets are ‘embedded’ in social relations, such as those supporting job search networks, 
and Jens Beckert (2009) argues that the social and institutional foundations of markets 
facilitate the pursuit of economic activity. Behind these two approaches, one may distinguish 
a strong and a weak sense of ‘institutions’. Each has developed separately, and this chapter 
will argue for a synthesis. 
 
Douglass North (1990) opens his study of institutions in economic life describing them as 
‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, they are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’. Searle (2005) offers a similar, if more detailed, 
definition: that institutions have certain special characteristics that distinguish them from 
other social phenomena, and set their norms apart from regulatory norms, such as the 
Highway Code, and from organisational routines and practical ‘rules of thumb’. They are 
defined by a set of constitutive rules; these rules determine status functions that are 
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collectively recognised and accepted; these functions are performable only in virtue of this 
recognition and acceptance; and they should carry recognised and accepted deontic powers, 
such as rights, obligations and permissions. He argues that statements about institutions in 
relation to action are of the kind: ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Thus instructing a worker to 
carry out a task or to apply an organisational routine, counts as exercising managerial 
authority in the context of an employment relationship. The worker’s obligation to obey that 
instruction is one of the rules, together with others, which constitutes an employment 
relationship. Independent contracting, self-employment, is constituted by a different set of 
rules. In employment law, the presence of an authority relationship is often used as one of the 
tests applied to determine whether a worker is engaged as an employee or self-employed. 
This will then be used to determine each party’s rights and obligations. 
 
In contrast, institutions in Solow’s account and those of many labour economists appear to 
belong to the weak sense, in which norms are self-enforcing. This is illustrated by his 
analysis of the norm just mentioned that the unemployed should not undercut the wages of 
employed workers. He argues this is maintained by the willingness of the employed to punish 
undercutting even at considerable cost to themselves. For simplicity, he assumes workers 
seek employment at an equilibrium wage, which takes account of factors such as their past 
investments in skills. However, workers who lose their jobs receive only unemployment 
benefits, the dole, which determines their reservation wage. They have to choose between 
two alternatives: either accept unemployment and the dole now, but with the prospect of 
future employment at the equilibrium wage; or undercut the equilibrium wage in order to gain 
employment now. However, incumbent workers will retaliate by themselves undercutting, 
which drives everyone’s pay down to the reservation wage. Thus the two payoff streams 
facing the unemployed worker are the reservation wage now followed by probable 
employment at the equilibrium wage, and employment at the reservation wage now and into 
the future. Provided the first is greater, the norm will hold.
3
 Thus, whereas institutions 
according to the weak sense rely upon the willingness of actors to punish those who 
transgress the norm, according to the strong sense, there is an additional deontic, obligational, 
element that commits the actors, such that, once the context is defined, certain behaviours are 
considered legitimate and others, inappropriate. For both North and Searle, this deontic 
element enables the actors to dispense with complex calculations as to the other party’s self-




In both cases, rules emerge that constrain short-term individual self-interest, giving rise to 
stable patterns of behaviour, and these can improve predictability in an uncertain decision 
environment, which is a considerable benefit in view of the limited cognitive abilities of 
human beings (Simon, 1976). The weak sense has proved valuable in modelling the 
emergence of behavioural norms out of evolutionary games (Bowles, 2005), but as Gibbons 
and Henderson (2012), argue, it depends upon the ability of actors to identify breach when it 
occurs, and that is often ambiguous. In contrast, the strong sense has more to say about 
systems of institutional rules, and in particular, addresses the problem of how to determine 
whether ‘X counts as breach in context C’. This chapter will argue that a socio-economic 
approach seeks to draw on a combination of the strengths of both senses. 
 
In social science usage, the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ bear many different 
meanings, so some clarification is needed. In the present context, it has become common to 
distinguish between them respectively as ‘games’ and ‘players’ (North, 1990, Scharpf, 1997). 
Within the game, its rules determine the legitimate roles and moves, and the players apply 
these with the aim of winning. Organisations are groups of individuals bound together to 
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achieve a particular purpose, and the institutions set the legitimate parameters for their 
strategies. A complication is that organisations, as Scharpf (1997) argues, are themselves 
‘composite actors’ with their own internal governance rules which assign their leadership 
specific powers and responsibilities. Following the team metaphor, ‘Manchester United’ is an 
organisation which has two sets of complimentary objectives: to win football competitions 
and to make a profit for its shareholders. It assumes its institutional mantle as a football club 
by signing up to the governance rules of the Football Association (FA), and similarly, for its 
business activities, it registers in legal form as a Limited Company. The organisation assumes 
the institutional forms of both a ‘football club’ and a ‘limited company’. In Searle’s terms, 
we might say: Manchester United (the organisation) counts as a football club (an institutional 
form) in the context of FA activities. The FA is itself an organisation with the purpose of 
regulating the sport of football. Historically, it played a key role in establishing a common set 
of rules of for the sport across England, thus facilitating the growth of football tournaments. 
 
Simply to argue that labour markets are social institutions is not very helpful. Instead, the 
chapter seeks to to show how differently constituted institutions shape the strategies of 
workers and firms and their collective organisations. In common with the economic 
approach, it builds up from the micro-level, considering how the two fundamental types of 
employment relationships, whether workers engage as employees or as self-employed 
independent contractors, and the growing number of the hybrid forms, respond to the needs 
of workers and firms, and also how they shape their respective strategies at both the 
individual and collective levels. It is grounded in the economic theory of competitive 
markets, as this provides the most developed theory we have of markets as self-regulating 
entities and with minimal demands on institutional support, and provides a basis for 
understanding evolutionary norms, but it will be argued that this is not sufficient. It seeks to 
bring out the changing balance between constraining and enabling rules and thus to shed light 
on current labour market developments. It seeks an approach that spans both ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ labour markets in the sense that employment relationships encompass what North 
(1990) describes as the ‘transaction’ and the ‘transformation’ components of employment, 
that is the allocative function of labour markets, the agreement of terms of exchange, and the 
ensuing productive collaboration, the latter being the purpose of the first two. These range 
from spot contracts for simple and easily defined services to long-term collaborations with 
complex governance structures, and as Williamson (1985) observes, the nature of the 
institutional support varies accordingly. 
 
This approach to institutions needs to avoid two potential dangers: the ‘panglossian’, and 
the ‘functionalist’. The first treats each institutional intervention as optimal, which makes it 
difficult to understand change (Streeck, 2009). The second reduces social norms and 
institutions to their market functions whereas in practice their functions are multiple, and 
shaped by many competing group interests as Thelen argues (2004). 
2.  Enablers, constraints and self-interest 
In recent years, two very significant advances have been made by means of experimental 
methods applied to common economic transactions, and both emphasise the enabling as 
opposed to the constraining role of institutions. 
 
They extend and reinforce Etzioni’s (1988) 
argument for recognition of the ‘moral dimension’ of economic activity, which he based on 
an older sociological literature. They concern reciprocity and risk. The first gives greater 
weight to people’s readiness to engage with what the sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1960) 
described as the ‘norm of reciprocity’, and owes much to the work of Ernst Fehr and 
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colleagues at the University of Zurich. Following this line of argument, suitable institutions 
are no less important for encouraging cooperation by fostering the expectation of reciprocity 
than for restraining opportunism. The second emphasises systematic biases and asymmetries 
in individual workers’ perceptions of labour market risks and opportunities, pioneered by the 
work of Kahneman et al. (2000). Building on their work, Schmid (2006) argues that by 
inducing workers to overestimate the risks, and underestimate the opportunities of 
employment change, they give rise to individual strategies that can aggravate rather than 
correct labour market imbalances. In this case, suitable institutions can mitigate these biases 
by framing risks and opportunities more appropriately, and by providing a safety net of 
mutual insurance. 
a) Reciprocity 
The work on positive and negative reciprocity demonstrates that people vary considerably 
according to their expectations that others will reciprocate beneficial actions in a series of 
transactions. They differ also in their willingness to sacrifice their immediate self-interest and 
punish a lack of reciprocity in order to maintain that norm (Fehr and Gintis, 2007, Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003). To laypeople this may seem obvious. On the other hand, attempts to 
prove that reciprocity, as in ‘tit for tat’ cooperation, can build on purely self-interested 
behaviour depend on very strong assumptions which make the emergence of cooperative 
behaviour seem unrealistic: they assume the long-term interest of both players, and that the 
game continues indefinitely (Boyer and Orléan, 1995). Yet Axelrod’s (1984) most striking 
empirical demonstration of the power of ‘tit-for-tat’ was the emergence of  cooperative 
behaviour between soldiers in the opposing trenches of the First World War. Known as ‘live 
and let live’, the soldiers deliberately fired to avoid harming their opposite numbers, playing 
tit-for-tat under very adverse conditions in which overt cooperation was punishable as 
treachery, and in which the generals actively sought to disrupt such behaviour (Ashworth, 
1980). In an industrial setting, one such form of reciprocity, between line managers and their 
workgroups against senior management, gave rise to Gouldner’s (1954: ch2) account of the 
‘indulgency pattern’ in his famous study of workplace relations in a gypsum plant: local 
management tolerated certain work practices that violated its rules in return for greater 
cooperation. We witness cooperation all around us despite agents having to manage 
conflicting interests. The application of experimental methods to simple economic 
transactions enables us to distinguish more precisely acts that correspond to individual self-
interest from those which are both other-directed and incur a significant individual cost. This 
makes it possible to explore how different frameworks for transactions may encourage either 
type of behaviour (Bowles, 1998).  
 
The readiness of many agents both to expect, and to engage in positive reciprocity, is well-
documented (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fehr and Gintis, 2007), and is well-illustrated for the 
present context by the experiments in the tradition of the trust and gift exchange games. In a 
series of experiments focused on task assignments in employee and self-employed 
relationships, Bartling et al. (2013) showed that a high proportion of subjects would 
anticipate positive reciprocity and agree to task flexibility, even in one-off transactions, and 
an even higher proportion did so for transactions repeated with the same partner. Nor was this 
a naïve response. Agents’ behaviour adapted as the experiments progressed. In the one-off 
transactions, cooperation declined with the accumulation of negative experiences, and in the 
repeated ones, positive reciprocity proved to be mutually reinforcing. Subjects could also 
switch between contract types, for example, if the ‘employer’ had abused its control over task 
assignments in the previous round. 
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It is widely acknowledged by both economists and sociologists that the effectiveness of 
social norms depends also on the willingness of agents to punish those who transgress them, a 
form of negative reciprocity (see Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). Such negative reciprocity 
has already been encountered in Solow’s example of willingness to punish undercutting. Fehr 
et al. argue that many social norms are like public goods in that the many benefit from their 
continued effectiveness, whereas the injured party often has to bear a disproportionate share 
of cost of punishing the transgressor. For example, a worker who feels her employer has 
imposed excessive job demands without her agreement may punish it by quitting. Such 
actions reinforce the norm that job demands should be increased only by mutual agreement, 
but the individual worker has to bear the cost of potential unemployment. Some subjects in 
Fehr’s experiments act as ‘strong reciprocators’ and are willing to bear such costs in the 
interest of sustaining the norm, whereas others are ‘self-interested’ and calculate that the 
costs of quitting outweigh the benefits for themselves. However, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) 
show that the willingness of strong reciprocators to act depends on their confidence in its 
efficacy, and that without this the process can unravel. 
 
Being willing to punish defection at one’s own expense is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
influence of a social norm. Two additional results are needed, both related to the often 
ambiguous nature of breach highlighted by Gibbons and Henderson (2012). The cooperative 
strategy is easily undermined: the longer breach remains unpunished, the more profitable it 
becomes; and mistakenly treating cooperative action as breach can also cause cooperation to 
unravel. Thus, first, breach needs to be clearly identifiable if the ‘punishment’ strategy is to 
work promptly, and not be misinterpreted as opportunistism. This implies reference to criteria 
that both parties can use. Secondly, such criteria should be understood and thought legitimate 
by third parties. Their importance is highlighted by the ‘public good’ experiments in which 
‘third parties’ are willing to punish unfair actions in transactions engaging others even when 
they are not directly affected and at cost to themselves. This theme will return in the 
discussion of voice channels, but for the present, both arguments signal the importance of 
criteria for breach that extend beyond the two transacting parties and accessible to third 
parties.  
 
In conclusion, it is not necessary to conceive of cooperation based exclusively on the 
immediate self-interest of the contracting parties because many human beings even in the 
economic sphere are willing play the cooperative strategy. The success of this strategy is 
supported by criteria, or norms, that extend beyond the actors involved in the current series of 
transactions, which reduce ambiguity, and can be understood by third parties. Field research, 
outside the behavioural lab, testifies to the prevalence of norms relating to fair behaviour in 
wage and employment transactions and which are likely to serve as signals as to how 
cooperative the other party may be (Behrend 1964, Kahneman et al. 1986, Bewley 1999). In a 
more modern form, these are consistent with older accounts by Keynes (1936) and Hicks 
(1955, 1974) that attributed nominal wage rigidity during recessions to workers’ fear of loss 
of relative position in a hierarchy of wage relativities between different groups which had 




b) Risky transitions and biased risk perceptions 
In contrast to the optimistic view on reciprocity and cooperation, biased views of risk 
appear to point in a more pessimistic direction – the expectation of increased rigidity and 
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resistance to change, combined with perverse risk-taking, which could impede the adaptive 
functions of labour markets. In recent decades this has become more pressing owing to the 
increased diversity of labour market transitions of individual workers, each of which has its 
associated risks. With the decline of large firm internal labour markets, growing diversity of 
production and service delivery methods, the spread of project-based work, and consequent 
changes in contractual forms, there is a need to consider a broader array of transitions than 
the traditional ones between education, employment, unemployment and inactivity (Schmid, 
2006).  
 
Drawing on the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Schmid (2006) argues 
that workers do not evaluate their current and prospective well-being in absolute terms, but in 
relation to certain reference points. Often they focus on the status quo or the recent past, 
which makes them particularly sensitive to potential losses: making them ‘loss averse’. At the 
same time, they tend to underestimate the value of future prospects. In combination, these 
make them more resistant to change and less willing to learn new skills than if they were to 
focus on the likely benefits of adaptation. When considering potential opportunities they tend 
to be loss averse, giving disproportionate weight to what they might lose, with a ratio of 
about 2:1. Equally, when faced with losses, they can be tempted to ‘bet their shirt’, and risk 
excessive losses in the hope of turning things around. This can lead them to over-invest for 
example in seeking entry into prestigious occupations, and becoming trapped in low-status 
entry positions, hoping for a ‘break’, long after their experience tells them that success is 
unlikely (Marsden, 2011). Schmid also draws out the implications of how people ‘frame’ 
labour market choices can affect their actions, for example, whether choices are framed in 
terms of potential losses or gains and how these interact with biases in their perceptions of 
risk. 
 
The cumulative effect of these individual-level biases undermines the allocative function 
of labour markets, and can also undermine the patterns of reciprocity discussed earlier if, for 
example, they cause workers to distrust beneficial actions that call for positive reciprocity. 
Bowles (1998) for example argues that market exchange emphasizes self-interested actions, 
whereas production requires a high degree of cooperation. Schmid argues that institutions 
that help to ‘de-commodify’ labour can ease this tension by sharing and mitigating risks, and 
by the manner in which choices are framed. Collective action may help correct these. There is 
plenty of evidence of workers’ self-help to develop coping strategies to mitigate the risks 
inherent in such transitions. For example, one of the earliest goals of trade unions was to set 
up hiring halls and establish a form of unemployment insurance (eg. Webb and Webb, 1920).  
3.  Institutional foundations: employment, sales and hybrid contracts  
In free labour markets, the supply of labour services is based on an initial agreement or 
contract. Two broad types of contract predominate: employees and self-employed 
independent contractors. In the OECD economies, together with trainee positions, which are 
normally geared towards work with one or other of these two contract types, they account for 
practically all kinds of paid employment activity. Although there has been a growth of so-
called ‘non-standard’ forms of employment in recent years, as will be seen, these are best 
viewed as hybrids, in between employment and self-employment, and are born of changing 
economic circumstances. 
 
It has been common to contrast these two contract types as ‘complete’ in the case of self-
employment – meaning that the services provided are fully delineated in advance, ex ante, 
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and encapsulated in a ‘sales’ contract – and ‘incomplete’ in the case of employees – meaning 
that the detailed task content is to be defined subsequently, ex post (eg. Malcomson, 1997). 
However, incompleteness is only half of the story. Beyond a certain point, it is simply 
uneconomic to delineate the attributes of services in ever greater detail, particularly as their 
complexity increases (Barzel, 1997), and specifying every contingency in advance in a 
contract will make it unworkably complex (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, we need to think 
more of degrees of incompleteness, rather than of polar types, and to consider the factors that 
influence the cost of delineation, of which more shortly. The other part of the story lies in the 
governance mechanisms associated with different types of contract, and which enable the 
parties to adjust to changing circumstances. Unlike delineation which admits varying degrees 
of incompleteness, governance mechanisms, because they are logical constructs, tend to fall 
into discrete types. The employment contract is incomplete by design, as the British 
employment law scholar, Hugh Collins (2010), observed. The sales contract is a commercial 
contract, designed so that its obligations are tradable and can be sold on to third parties for 
whom only the words in the contract will count (Devlin, 1965: 44). The parties need to know 
specifically which set of rules will govern their collaboration: in this particular case, should 
adjustments to the changing mix of work tasks required be dealt with by managerial authority 
within an existing contract, or by renegotiation of a sales contract?  
 
Figure 1 illustrates these considerations, drawing on Mintzberg’s (1979, 2009)  theory of 
organisations as coordinating bodies. Organisations can coordinate by delineating tasks in 
detail, what he calls ‘standardisation’, or by delineating only broad elements, and relying 
upon a flexible process of ‘mutual adjustment’. The former is associated with bureaucratic 
work organisation, and the latter with what Mintzberg calls ‘adhocracy’. The cells in the 
figure also provide illustrations of work systems in which both forms can be found under 
either contractual type. 
 




The study of institutions and their constitutive rules comes into its own when it can be 
show that the ‘games’ they support lead to different outcomes. This can be seen by tracing 
the different strategies that the self-employment and employee contracts encourage. The rest 
of this section draws on the experimental evidence discussed earlier relating to reciprocity 
and to risky transitions in an attempt to highlight the different strategic directions taken by 
 Type of contract 
 
Degree of incompleteness 
 
Self-employed Employee 
Standardised tasks that 
admit easy delineation. 
Task may be simple, or 
standardised by occupational 
design (eg. Craft and 
professional occupations) 
 
Machine and professional 
bureaucracy 
Mutual adjustment in the 
face of tasks that are hard to 
delineate and about which 
there is uncertainty.  
Creative work organised 
on a project basis as in 
media and IT 
Flexible work patterns 









Figure 2 sketches out a representation of the two contract types, and seeks to combine 
elements of both reciprocity and ‘risky transitions’. The purpose of juxtaposing the two 
contract types is to prepare the ground for a broader discussion of how institutional regulation 
of economic risks contributes to the working of labour markets. It also highlights the value of 
each contract type respectively to discontinuous and continuous production. It begins by 
considering the case where delineation is simple, and later considers where greater degrees of 
mutual adjustment are involved. 
 
Suppose that a firm normally employs two tasks, A and B, but in different mixes according 
to its sales plans, and that its preferred option is to assign labour to the task that will generate 
the highest sales revenue in any given period. Suppose this is task A (which Figure 2 shows in 
upper case). It can hire self-employed workers at the start of each period for that task by 
negotiating a mutually satisfactory fee. Once the contract is signed, both parties are 
committed for the whole period. For the firm, the risk is that of committing to A, when B 
turns out to be the high revenue task. On the plus side, the agreement is for one period only, 
and can be negotiated from scratch for the next period. Alternatively, if the firm is uncertain 
about sales and does not wish to commit itself to a particular task, it can hire workers as 
employees on the understanding that they should be flexible and undertake either task as 
determined by the employer. Suppose that one task is more onerous than the other, so that its 
'cost of effort' and the corresponding wage are greater. The parties can agree a wage that 
reflects the anticipated frequency of both tasks. The advantage for the employer is that as 
sales progress during the period, it can reassign workers to the task most in demand. It 
therefore avoids the potential losses associated with the sales contract from having contracted 
for the less profitable task. However, it comes at a price. For workers to agree to flexible 
assignment, they must feel confident that the firm will not cheat by assigning them to a third 
task C, outside their zone of acceptance, and involving a higher cost of effort. The firm might 
be tempted to do this if C generates higher sales revenues, but becomes the most profitable 
only if paid at the wage levels agreed for A and B. In other words, workers will agree to an 
employment contract only if they believe the employer will use task flexibility in good faith. 
Otherwise, they will insist on the more specific duties of the sales contract. This has 
implications for pay adjustments between periods. Under the pure sales contract, each period 
involves a fresh negotiation. Under the employment contract, negotiation at the start of each 
period is constrained by the need to convince the other party that it will act in good faith – 
employees will respect the need for flexibility, and the employer will not abuse it. In other 
words, both have to signal that they will stick to the agreement even if it means some short-
term sacrifice of their self-interest. Driving a very hard bargain over pay at the start of each 
period would signal the opposite: prioritisation of short-term distributive over longer term 
conjunctive gains (see Section 7 below). This introduces a degree of inertia compared with 
the self-employed contract because deviations from what was agreed in the previous period 








Key: The upper case letter denotes the task with the highest sales, and the lower case, that with lower sales. 
The arrows denote transitions between periods. In State 1, A commands the highest sales, and in State 2, B 
does.The solid arrow denotes an expected transition within an employment relationship, and consent for the firm 
to adapt to the task associated with the highest sales. The finely dotted line to C denotes the possible assignment 
to task C followed by a quit towards self-employment in the next period. The pecked lines for independent 
contractors denote the consideration of a new contract together with the outside option. 
 
Both worker households and firms have to be able to function over time as ‘going 
concerns’, and therefore both need coping strategies to ensure a continuous flow of activity 
and income. Within certain limits, the employment relationship offers this to both parties. 
Employees gain a measure of income security, and firms secure their supply of labour. It also 
provides a framework within which increasing reciprocity can underpin increasing joint 
investments in skills and knowledge. It therefore favours the ‘inside option’. For independent 
contractors, their bargaining power depends upon having an attractive ‘outside option’ so that 
the strongest motivation for workers is to neglect firm specific skills and to cultivate those 
that open up opportunities in other firms. Workers’ coping strategies to ensure continuity of 
income have many other manifestations as well. They generate a demand for institutional 
forms and social supports that encourage closure which conflicts with open, competitive, 
markets. The Webbs (1920) identified ‘mutual insurance’ as one of the responses of early 
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influence on social insurance régimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Perlman (1928: chs 6 & 7) 
documented practices of sharing or ‘communism of opportunity’ to stabilise employment 
among early forms of worker organisation, and also saw such insurance as a means of 
underpinning workers’ individual bargaining power. In London’s seasonal trades, Webb and 
Freeman (1912) document established patterns of workers ‘dovetailing’ activities to ensure a 
continuous flow of income despite having to move between many different jobs during the 
year, and these were often built upon membership of social and ethnic groups. These can be 
thought of as methods of self-help to sustain outside options, enabling workers to cope with 
labour market risks, and insecure livelihoods.
6
 A similar line of thinking can be found in 
Kerr’s (1954) famous account of ‘balkanised’ labour markets. Workers gain access to craft or 
occupational markets by peer recognition and by passing apprenticeship or professional 
competence tests which provide both a degree of occupational closure, and restrict access to 
work to insiders. Di Tomaso (2013) argues that labour market discrimination is a bye-product 
of self-help networks that are based on a degree of closure within social groups. The next 
sections explore the internal dynamics of stable and of transient employment systems, 
seeking to show how central institutional supports are to their operation. 
4.  Sustaining reciprocity in the standard employment relationship  
In a famous essay, Herbert Simon (1976) argues that in social and economic situations in 
which uncertainty and lack of relevant information make calculation of costs and returns 
difficult, it is advantageous to focus on ‘procedural’ rather than ‘substantive’ rationality. In 
other words, the parties concerned should agree procedures that enable substantive questions 
to be resolved once better information is available. Managerial authority to direct labour is 
one such procedure, and is key to his approach to the employment relationship. However, to 
be adopted, such procedures must be acceptable to both parties, and hence, one has to 
examine what protections are available to prevent managers from abusing task flexibility 
allowed by the open-ended content of the contract. There is an extensive literature on the 
pressures to ‘ratchet up’ work loads after hiring, and on worker resistance to this (eg. Lazear, 
1986, Burawoy 1979), yet if the normal state of the employment relationship were to be one 
of endless haggling, it would surely tip the balance in favour of other contractual models such 
as independent contracting where mutual obligations are made explicit in advance, as was the 
case in the nineteenth century before the spread on the employment relationship, when sub-
contracting had been the most common arrangement in industry (Mottez, 1966; Jacoby, 1985; 
Schmiede and Schudlich, 1976). 
a) The zone of acceptance as a bargain 
How can one combine the exchange process which is based on a market relationship with 
an open-ended contract which underpins an organisational relationship involving productive 
collaboration? Simon’s (1951) solution was to develop a simple bargaining model, a 
precursor to those used later to model union-bargaining over wages and employment (see 
survey by Oswald, 1993). The key is to identify a set of tasks and their respective shadow 
prices that are of interest to both parties, and represents a zone of potential agreement. As 
discussed in the previous section, the employer wants the job to include a variety of tasks that 
is wide enough to ensure it has both the necessary labour services available when its precise 
needs become known, and enough flexibility to avoid periods of under-employment. It also 
knows that on average, some tasks generate more value than others, and that some appeal 
more to potential employees than others. It therefore has to negotiate a wage level will attract 
workers for a sufficiently wide range of tasks for its production and cost plans. 
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This is illustrated in Figure 3. The vertical axis shows increasing wages, and decreasing 
profits. The horizontal axis shows tasks ordered according to some characteristic  valued by 
both parties, such as their skill requirements or complexity. The firm’s profits increase for a 
time as these demands increase, but after a point they decrease because workers lack the 
necessary skills, and become stressed by excessive job demands. The thick inverted-U line 
Sf0 represents the employer’s break-even point. Above this line, combinations of tasks and 
wage rates are not profitable, whereas they become more profitable as one moves south-
westwards towards Sf1 and below. Similarly, for workers, pairs of wages and tasks below 
their satisfaction curve Sw0 are not worth taking, and their attractiveness increases as one 
moves towards curve Sw1 and above. The area of potential agreement is shown by the tasks 
and prices enclosed by curves Sf0 and Sw0. 
 
The two parties then agree a wage, WA, and the zone of acceptance encompasses the tasks, 
within the area of potential agreement, between points A and B where it crosses the respective 
break-even curves of each party. For a slightly higher wage, the employer may gain access to 
some tasks to the left of A which are still to the right of the worker’s break-even satisfaction 
curve. These might be less satisfying tasks for which the worker requires a higher wage in 
compensation. For a lower wage, the worker would be willing to trade tasks close to A in 
exchange for more frequent assignment to tasks to the right of B. 
 




Source: Adapted from Simon (1951), and Marsden (1999: ch 1). For a simple explanation 
of the shape of the employer's curve Sf0 see Cartter (1959). 
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Simon’s model captures some very important aspects of employee’s jobs. First, the great 
majority of jobs involve multiple rather than single tasks. According to the US O*net 
database, compiled using field studies for its job placement services, the modal occupation 
includes about 20-30 different tasks, and many include considerably more. They also 
comprise a core of high frequency regular tasks, and a periphery of less frequently used 
tasks.
7
 This suggests that, in practice, before hiring, many workers and employers have a 
common experience of the task diversity of many jobs which may inform their negotiations. 
As discussed later, this is often related to established patterns of occupations and training. 
However, there is also an important fringe of tasks that increase flexibility for the employer, 
but could also prove controversial after hiring. Simon suggests, but does not really develop, 
the idea that such differences need to be resolved by goodwill with both parties seeking a 
solution that maximises their joint well-being. This is a necessary condition for efficient 
coordination by management authority, but it cannot be taken for granted.
8
 There are two 
reasons for this, and both lead to the conclusion that voice channels provide important 
supports to the operation of the employment relationship. 
 
The first, already mentioned in explaining Figure 3, but also present in reality, is that tasks 
vary in their value to both parties, and both may seek to ‘cherry pick’ their most valued tasks 
at the expense of the other. Indeed, if there are significant quit or dismissal costs, then one 
party could go further and use these to pressurise the other outside the zone of acceptance 
(Task C in the previous section). The second arises from Simon’s assumption that 
management authority is exercised simply by selecting the tasks to which employees are 
assigned, which assumes that management has all the necessary knowledge and information. 
For simple work environments this may seem uncontroversial. However, where workers 
apply high levels of skills and professional judgement in their work, and where jobs, in 
Williamson’s terminology, are idiosyncratic, management frequently lacks this information 
and is dependent on workers’ cooperation. This may serve as a counter-weight to exploitation 
by management, but it also introduces the practical possibility that workers can pressurise 
management to assign them the tasks they prefer within the zone of acceptance, and in a more 
conflictual environment, both sides can try to extend the zone of acceptance to their own 
advantage by means of local bargaining pressures. There are several mechanisms by which 
such pressures can be kept under control with varying degrees of success. 
 
b) Sustaining reciprocity in the zone of acceptance 
Looking at cooperation within the employment relationship through the lens of 
evolutionary games (eg. Maynard Smith, 1982, Axelrod, 1984, Kreps, 1990), and following 
the weak concept of institutions, one may construct a model in which the parties will continue 
to cooperate provided that defection is always punished, and that the present value of the 
resulting sanctions outweighs that of any potential gains. Thus, if the employer knows 
workers will quit if pressurised into less favourable task assignments, possibly even outside 
their zone of acceptance, , then provided the cost of replacing the worker exceeds the 
employer's gain, it will respect the worker's interests, and vice versa, and cooperation will 
continue as a self-enforcing behaviour pattern.  
 
Nevertheless, the the aggrieved party may not always be in a position to punish breaches, 
especially if the costs of applying sanctions against the offending party are not symmetrical. 
For example, in a period of labour shortage, the advantage may swing towards the worker, 
and in one of high unemployment, it may swing the other way. This could destabilise long-
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run cooperation. Likewise, new management may destabilise patterns of cooperation 
especially if its orientation is more short-term than its predecessor’s. This suggests that while 
simple local cooperation/punishment mechanisms may contribute to the effective working of 
management authority under competitive conditions, they are not sufficient and other means 
of communication are necessary. Two stand out in particular: the need for a common 
language and for voice channels. Both can strengthen the position of ‘strong reciprocators’ as 
a common language of say job classifications makes obligations and breach more transparent, 
and voice provides scope to warn the other party about perceived breach long before 
sanctions are engaged. 
c) Voice and a common language 
Considering the need for a common language, Gibbons and Henderson (2012) highlight 
the problem of clarity and ambiguity of breach in relation to self-enforcing models of 
cooperation. Given a degree of job idiosyncrasy, and uncertainty about task needs, it is likely 
that in many instances the occurrence of breach will be ambiguous. As a result, the decision 
of whether or not to punish may not be clear cut. For reasons already discussed, this may 
undermine cooperation.  
 
Formalisation may also be counter-productive. Slichter et al (1960) observed that complex 
rules about job assignments may encourage the haggling they were intended to prevent. 
Williamson (1975) has argued that complex contingent claims contracts are impractical for 
the great majority of employment relationships. An alternative solution is for the parties to 
rely upon commonly understood work rules, and to use these as criteria for boundary tasks to 
which workers and their line managers can easily refer (Marsden, 1999). This solution meets 
two essential conditions for boundary criteria: aligning workers' skills with employers' jobs, 
and being enforceable by ordinary workers and their line-managers. In essence, aligning 
workers' skills and employers' job needs can proceed either of two directions: from the skills 
workers bring to the job in which job design is adapted to workers’ skills, or alternatively, 
from the employers' job demands, which, in the words of one U.S. production engineer, 
'moulds the man to the job' (Piore, 1969). Sengenberger (1985) identified the first as the 
'training approach', and Lazear (1995: 86) identified the second as the 'production approach'. 
Work rules identifying boundary tasks for the first could relate to use of certain 
occupationally specific tools and procedures, and for the second, work associated with 
specific equipment or administrative processes used by the firm. To be credible, such items 
must relate to the everyday experience of workers' jobs, and be able to serve as symbols of 
Searle’s status assignments. The second principle is that such rules should be enforceable, 
that is breach should be readily identifiable. For this they should relate either to the set of key 
tasks making up a job, or, in the case of more flexible team working, to the function 
undertaken. Thus, the first makes its point of reference the tasks making up an individual 
work post, and the second, to tasks comprising a recognised collective function or team-based 
activity. Lam and Marsden (2016) show that these four types of rule delineating job 
boundaries map onto Henry Mintzberg's four patterns of organisation (Figure 4). The reason 
is quite straightforward. Mintzberg (1979, 2009) argues that the goal of organisations is to 
coordinate activity, and that this has to obey two principles: whether coordination focuses on 
inputs, and notably the detail of the tasks employees undertake, or on outputs, that is setting 
objectives which employees use their expert knowledge to achieve; and whether it proceeds 
by standardising work roles, and thus making them clear and predictable, or by mutual 
adjustment between flexible work roles. In summary, these provide a background of 
guideposts to assist the negotiation process Simon envisages for the employment relationship. 
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Without these, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the parties to establish boundaries to the 
zone of acceptance that are meaningful to them, and to identify breach when it occurs. Thus, 
in the employment relationship, an organisational logic imposes itself on the framework for 
exchange. 
 
Figure 4 Four approaches to monitoring work obligations 
 
Adapted from Lam and Marsden 2016.  
 
 
Voice channels can play a very important part in sustaining goodwill cooperation within 
employment relationships, and their operation is facilitated by the development of benchmark 
rules to which the parties may refer. In recent years, there has been growing interest in 
various kinds of voice mechanisms: channels between individual employees and their 
managers (Rousseau et al., 2006), management-led employee voice, such as through quality 
circles and certain types of goal-setting and appraisal systems (Willman et al 2006, Cawley et 
al 1998, Levy and Williams, 2004), and collective, representative voice, and how all three 
interact with each other (Marsden, 2013). Whereas the breach/punishment approach depends 
upon a formulaic interaction in which these signals are clearly understood by each party, 
voice enables more nuanced communication about the kinds of task assignments that are felt 
to be fair, and within the zone of acceptance, and those which push one or other party 
towards its limits. They also allow the parties to adopt a problem-solving approach to mutual 
adjustment, and if necessary to consider renegotiating the initial deal if it is felt that 
conditions have changed significantly since the beginning. Such eventualities are recognized 
in employment law. Under English law, a legally enforceable contract underpins the 
employment relationship, but as Collins observes, its purpose is to ‘stabilize expectations’, 
not to prescribe solutions, which need discussion, and so Collins (2006: 139) argues for 
participatory channels. In similar vein, French employment law distinguishes between minor 
changes to the zone of acceptance, which are deemed to be part of the initial deal, and 
substantial ones that require renegotiation. The line between the two is determined in relation 
to the initial agreement, and hence to the intentions of the two parties when contracting 
(Lyon-Caen and Pélissier, 1988, pp. 306ff). In other words, employment law recognises that 
communication between the parties is an important aspect of the open-ended nature of the 
employment relationship, and that this depends upon adjustments that remain mutually 
satisfactory and without the need to treat each change as a potential breach. This still leaves 
open the question as to whether such communication should be individual or mediated by 
collective voice channels. 
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d) Biased risk perceptions, localised self-help, and restrictive rules 
As mentioned earlier, Schmid (2006) argues that the biased risk perceptions of individual 
workers could mean that individual and small-group voice mechanisms are overly restrictive 
owing to loss aversion and conservative assessments of the potential benefits of change. As a 
result, they will predominantly choose exchange norms that protect the status quo rather than 
mutual adjustment. Schmid develops this argument in relation to preparing for labour market 
transitions, but it applies equally to decisions relating to the zone of acceptance and its 
flexibility. There has been a large number of studies of workplace and shop-floor 
organisation the support the potency of his argument. Gouldner (1954) developed his theory 
of the function of seniority rules over work assignments and progression in relation to 
workers’ desire to restrict management’s control of uncertainty in the work environment. 
Greater discretion gives management more power over allocations, and introduces greater 
uncertainty into workers’ lives, which affects the balance of power between the two groups. 
Crozier (1965) developed a similar argument: that the bureaucratic work rules of the French 
public sector were insisted on by workers, not the managers, in order to make their own lives 
more predictable and to limit management’s local power. Brown (1973) developed a similar 
analysis of the working of ‘custom and practice’ in the regulation of piecework bargaining in 
British engineering: workers and their shop stewards took management’s own decisions and 
omissions as a source of precedent. Thus in all three examples, the decentralised response of 
the weaker party was to try to bind the actions of the more powerful one by its own rules. 
Using their own localised self-help strategies, workers could create zones of greater 
predictability in their work lives which protected them against loss from adverse decisions by 
their managers, but the resulting rigidities led to greater organisational slack, and in the long-
run to lower incomes for both parties. 
 
Biased risk perceptions and general risk aversion can be overcome with a more holistic 
view of the potential benefits of change. An early champion of this view was was Allan 
Flanders (1964) writing on productivity agreements which were agreed between management 
and higher level representatives, such as enterprise and in other countries, works councils. 
Schmid also argues that collective voice channels can overcome some of these biases, and 
develop more flexible norms of exchange. For example, works councils are in a position to 
take a longer view of the benefits of cooperation, and in Germany, by virtue of their 
codetermination rights, can also offer protection against short-term opportunism by 
management. By virtue of their often long-term relationship with the firm’s management, 
they can also form a good appreciation of whether or not it is acting in good faith (Jirjahn et 
al, 2011). As Scharpf argues, recognised institutions can allay concerns about ‘worst case 
scenarios’ that undermine cooperation. In this case, individual fears that management will 
exploit every concession would contribute to restrictive worker attitudes to flexibility, 
whereas higher level institutions such as works councils are able to oversee flexibility and 
ensure greater protection of worker interests (Kotthof, 2013). 
5.  Transient employment relationships supported by social networks and 
social norms 
In recent years, the growth of precarious, and ‘non-standard’ employment, has been seen 
as part of the erosion of the post-war settlement in the advanced industrial countries. 
According to the ILO (2015: Fig 2.5), across the economically advanced countries, the share 
of permanent full-time employees has been shrinking while that of temporary workers and 
the self-employed has been creeping upwards. Moreover, the latter’s associated poverty rates 
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are two to three times higher, which could be read as suggesting both an element of re-
commodification of labour services, and that Simon’s model of the employment relationship 
assumes a more favourable balance of power than applies to many workers. 
 
Closer inspection of ‘transient’ employment reveals a more complex picture. The term is 
used to designate jobs that have no implied duration beyond the current period, and so 
embraces both self-employment and temporary employment. A significant proportion of 
those in transient employment are highly skilled and highly educated, and are engaged in 
self-employed work that involves a high degree of mutual adjustment. Often their work 
requires both motivation and creativity. There is also another large group, concentrated in 
service and sales and elementary occupations, in temporary work whose jobs involve more 
delineation and control, where the dismissal and non-renewal threats are more common. This 
is illustrated by Figure 5 below. The vertical axis shows the degree of mutual adjustment 
during the contract, and the horizontal axis, the implied duration over periods. The hybrid 
contract forms show the lowest levels of incompleteness and mutual adjustment. 
 
 

















In transient employment many of the same kinds of conflicts of interest arise as in 
permanent employment. These need to be resolved if collaboration is to proceed smoothly, 
but not necessarily by more detailed contracts. For example, at the high-skill end of project-
based work, many such tensions can be seen in Paul and Kleingartner’s (1994) study of 
Hollywood screen actors in the period after the break-up of the large studio system. These 
included disputes over intellectual and artistic property rights, how many original ideas to 
hold back for future projects, ownership of manuscripts, tracking new sources of derived 
‘residual’ incomes, actors’ concern about over-exposure and audience fatigue from use of 
their images, moral rights on the subsequent use of material, favouritism in selection, and so 
on. In the less glamorous activity of milk delivery, O’Connell Davidson (1994) illustrates the 
disputes between dairy owners and milk deliverers, both self-employed and employees, over 
qualitative aspects of performance: how far should deliverers take on additional products on 
behalf of the dairy or on their own account, how much credit should they extend to late 
payers, how much time should they devote to signing up new customers, and if they are more 
geographically dispersed, and so on? Should the dairies undercut door-step prices by those 
they offer to supermarkets? If the dairies own the delivery vehicles, how much should they 
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charge for rent and repairs? O’Connell Davidson’s conclusion was that although the precise 
manifestations of control problems differed between employees and self-employed 
franchisees, the same underlying problem of engendering cooperation despite divergent 
interests was present under both contractual forms, but needed to be resolved in different 
ways. It is to these that we now turn focusing first on high-skilled and then on low-skilled 
work. The difference compared with the employment relationship is that many of the long-
term sanctions and rewards for good performance are absent because of the lack of implied 
continuity, and the need highlighted earlier to maintain one’s outside options to ensure a 
supply of work for the next period. One needs therefore to look for their functional 
equivalents in this different work environment. A number of empirical studies of this kind of 
employment reveal the frameworks by which the actors seek to ensure cooperative behaviour. 
We now look at these in the context of high-skilled and low-skilled transient employment. 
a) High skilled transient employment 
The high-skill end of transient employment is often associated with project-based 
employment. In this, workers combine for a particular project, such as might occur for a new 
media product, or an IT project, and may disperse when the project is completed. In this 
environment, projects generally focus on one-off creation, such as a film or a new piece of 
software, rather than the repeated reproduction of a good or service as in an automobile 
factory or a government tax service (Baumann, 2003). The roles of project leaders and 
collaborators are more fluid than those of managers and employees and may change between 
projects, as Piore and Sabel (1984) observed in analogous small firm collaborations.  
 
The high-skill model requires leaders in a management role to spend considerable time 
defining and agreeing goals or outputs and agreeing necessary adjustments, and to abstain 
from managing the details of the work process.
9
 Later on, we discuss their relationship with 
investors. There is a limit to how far the contracts can delineate attributes of the tasks to be 
performed, which applies more strongly as task complexity and mutual adjustment increase. 
Thus, just as in the employment relationship, there is an increasing need for each party to be 
able to count on the other’s good faith. The question is how can this come about in the 
absence of the repeated exchange in long-term employment relationships. The most important 
functional equivalent cited in recent studies substitutes membership of an organisation with 
that of social networks and communities of practice.
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 Even though projects may bring 
collaborators together for a short period before they disperse again, membership of the 
community of practice provides a similar continuity of memory to that provided within the 
firm by the employment relationship. Its members provide the collective memory that 
supports reputation for past collaboration, and an important source of information for future 
projects similar to the way social networks are used for finding jobs and for recruitment 
(Rees, 1960, Granovetter, 1973). They are also an important vehicle for mutual help as fellow 
members help each other to gain access to key information, but by the same token, may 
exclude non-members (Di Tomaso, 2013). In line with the previous discussion of weak and 
strong senses of norms, reputation can function in two ways: it can provide information about 
an agent’s past performance, and it can also convey information about their commitment to 
the norms and standards of behaviour of different occupational and social groups. The first 
might be associated with Williamson’s (1985) approach, whereas the second finds more echo 
in the work of Saxenian (1996) and others on the role of social networks for sharing ideas, 
and job information within the occupational communities of Silicon Valley. Likewise, the 
work of Jones and Walsh (1997), Sydow and Staber (2002), and Baumann (2003) illustrates 
similar processes at work in the networks of the US, German and British media industries. 
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Communities of practice also need anchor points, and these are provided, for example, in the 
Hollywood study by the work of the union in tracking down residual incomes for its 
members, in Silicon Valley, by links with major research universities, and in the German and 
British media industries examined by Baumann by links established through former public 
providers. 
b) ‘Precarious’ contracts for low skilled and routine work 
The situation is somewhat different for low skilled and routine work where delineation and 
control are easier to effect. Studies by Muehlberger (2007), and Muehlberger and Bertolini 
(2008) comparing contract work for tied sales agents in the Austrian and Italian insurance 
industries highlight the greater extent of dependency and control faced by contract workers 
whose situation is closer to that of the milk deliverers than the IT workers of SiliconValley. 
Nevertheless, like the dairies, the insurance companies experienced the need to motivate the 
agents to work in the company interest, and to acquire firm-specific knowledge, such as about 
their products, and this was achieved in part by incentives which improved with longevity of 
the relationship, and partly by activation of the social networks among the agents. Like the 
milk deliverers there was also an issue of quality of business brought in, for example, 
customers who may be bad payers, or to whom products might be miss-sold with possible 
reputational consquences for the firm. By insisting on tied agents, the companies restricted 
the outside option associated with self-employment, but it enabled them to develop a form of 
repeated exchange, but with more tightly prescribed roles than for the highly qualified. 
 
There can also be a relationship between the two types of transient employment. In a study 
of transient-type occupations in the UK, the author observed extended entry tournaments in 
which aspirant members of an occupation competed for entry well into their mid-career stage 
of life (Marsden, 2011). Such tournaments serve the industry well not only by providing 
incentives for ‘stars’ to flourish, and sanctions should they cease to peform, but also by 
attracting large numbers of aspirants who take on short-term low-paid work in the hope of a 
‘break’ that will enable to cross the threshold into the occupation. That would bring peer 
recognition, and membership of the high status part of an occupational community (Jones and 
Walsh, 1997), but failure to do so leaves the worker in a crowded secondary labour market. 
6.  The production of skills and skill categories 
Occupations and job classifications provide transparency and a language for both 
transactions and transformation, as they guide agents as to both the type investments that can 
be made, and the performance standards that can be expected from different categories of 
skills. Indeed, without occupational classifications, it is much harder for organisations to 
communicate their recruitment needs to job seekers, and to compare performance between 
employees since one may only compare those in similar jobs. They also provide a framework 
for investment in skills and training. They are a central attribute of a functioning labour 
market. Transparency concerning the capabilities attached to a particular occupation supports 
mobility between firms, as well as investments in skills. It also has profound implications for 
how we pay for such skills. Lack of transparency and uncertainty about the quality of training 
can undermine the development of a market and that may inhibit both employers and 
potential trainees from investing in the requisite skills, a theme discussed at length for other 
markets, for example, by Akerlof, 1970, and Podolny 2001. This section seeks to explain the 
different ways in which institutional supports address these problems, and what may happen 
when they fail. In essence, they provide assurance that the parties will act in good faith, by 
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protecting against short-term self-interested behaviour. As will be seen, these protections 
often work less by punishing certain kinds of behaviour, than by tilting rewards to favour 
cooperation. It begins by looking at some necessary supports for inter-firm markets for 
transferable skills, and then examines those for firm-specific skills, before looking at job 
flexibility and risk sharing among employers and employees. 
a) Conflicts over cost and quality of training for transferable and specific skills 
One of Gary Becker’s (1975) many contributions to labour economics has been to identify 
the fundamental differences in the nature of investments in skill formation depending on 
whether training leads to general skills that are transferable between employers, or whether 
they are specific to an individual organisation. In a nutshell, for training provided in the 
workplace, firms will not pay for general training because trainees can always quit and take 
the investment with them. The trainees should pay. The return on their investment is reflected 
in the higher pay they earn subsequently compared with unskilled workers. Conventionally, 
they pay for their training by accepting a low trainee pay rate below the value of their 
productive work during this period. In a competitive market for transferable skills, shortages 
lead to a higher wage and so induce greater worker investments until the market returns to 
equilibrium. This mechanism is not needed for firm-specific skills because the skills are not 
transferable. For these, firms train according to their production plans, but will normally pay 
their skilled workers enough to induce them to stay, and so will share some of the costs and 
returns. In addition, workers will be reluctant to invest heavily in firm-specific skills because 
their employer remains free to fire them.  
 
Becker’s model makes an implicit assumption that training quality for transferable skills is 
transparent, yet this is often problematic for workplace training because the employer can 
always skew the mix between learning opportunities and productive work in its own favour. 
Without some agreed standards, and certification, both the quality of workplace training and 
trainee productivity are hard to determine, and a mutually satisfactory exchange becomes 
hard to ascertain. The employer’s method of providing workplace training in exchange for a 
low trainee wage comes under pressure: skilled workers anxious about trainees being used as 
cheap substitutes (Ryan, 2004), and aspirant trainees who suspect a ‘market for lemons’ 
(Akerlof, 1970). As Ryan has shown, if skilled workers fear competition from cheap trainee 
labour, they may seek to restrict trainee numbers directly or to choke off supply by pressing 
for a higher trainee wage. Uncertainty about training quality may also discourage trainees 
from investing in workplace training. Aspirant trainees who are uncertain about the quality of 
training at an individual firm would require a higher trainee wage, which then discourages the 
employer from providing high value training.
11
 As the firms providing the best training opt 
out, average quality across all firms declines. In such circumstances, firms may need either to 
assume a greater share of the cost of training while maintaining its transferability, or to find 
ways to make their employees’ skills less transparent to outsiders. Both responses put the 
occupational labour market under pressure. With the first, firms providing high quality 
training are exposed to free-riding by competitor firms that poach their skilled labour; with 
the second, the skills lose their transferability and become more like those of firm internal 
labour markets (Marsden, 1985: ch 8). 
 
Although firm-specific skills are arguably more under the control of individual employers, 
some analogous problems arise. These hinge very much on the degree of investment required 
from workers. In Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) influential account, workers acquire such 
skills as a by-product of working, and learn skills by a process of osmosis. In this case, the 
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degree of worker engagement needed is fairly limited. These were mostly semi-skills in mass 
production industries. However, subsequent research on skill formation in Japan by 
sociologists such as Koike and Inoki (1990) indicates that there are alternative models of on-
the-job learning, notably when the process involves more problem-solving than osmosis. This 
model, which Koike also contrasts with the US model, involves considerable worker 
investment as the process typically uses rotation among different tasks which have to be 
learned, enabling problem-solving at a more abstract level, based on analysis of relationships 
between tasks and how they fit into a broader integrated work system. In the development of 
what Koike refers to as ‘broad’ or ‘intellectual’ skills, the individual firm remains the central 
focus, but the ‘cost of effort’ that workers invest is considerably greater than in the older 
taylorist models. Reflecting back on Mintzberg’s typology, on-the-job training in Doeringer 
and Piore’s model is very much that of ‘machine bureaucracy’ whereas that described and 
conceptualised by Koike and Inoki belongs to the world of ‘adhocracy’ where coordination of 
work roles involves a high degree of mutual adjustment. 
 
In between Becker’s two ideal types of transferable and specific skills, Franz and  Soskice 
(1995), and Aoki (2010)  argue that there exist several hybrid forms applying the two types of 
skills in combination, such as in large firms in Germany and Japan. In the German case, 
many technically advanced large firms build firm-specific structures on the foundations 
provided by the occupational model. General skills provided by apprenticeship training are 
supplemented by more advanced skills provided by individual employers. These, they argue, 
shift the balance in Becker’s model as the latter type of skills significantly reduce the 
transferability of the whole bundle of skills that individual workers apply in their jobs. These 
compound skills were the foundation of what Sorge and Streeck (1988) described as the 
German model of flexible specialisation based on ‘diversified quality production’. In this 
model, workers apply high levels of skill, often with a significant degree of redundancy with 
respect to their immediate job demands, but it provides them with the ability to work flexibly 
at a wide range of different tasks, and to develop a more integrated view of their work roles.  
b) Employer collective action to prevent free-riding 
Despite the theoretical strength of Becker’s argument, there is a good deal of evidence that 
many firms that train for transferable skills incur considerable net costs. Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998, 1999) and Dustmann and Schoenberg (2008), show considerable diversity in 
Germany for apprenticeship training costs, with firms in some sectors, especially in 
engineering, contributing heavily to the cost of training, whereas in some other sectors, 
notably some services, they train at a profit. When firms are net contributors how can they 
avoid the damaging effects of poaching by other firms without undermining the occupational 
market? 
 
One solution that maintains skill transferability is by employer collective action to 
organise training and to discourage poaching. Compared with Britain, where a similar 
apprenticeship system went into long-term decline, undermined by poaching problems, in 
Germany, the system survived and flourished. There firms and workers have been able to 
monitor training quality: within the firm by works councils and other workplace 
representatives; and at the local labour market level, by the activities of local chambers of 
industry and commerce. According to Drexel, publication of apprentice pass lists enables 
families and local employers to monitor the apprentice graduation rates of other local firms. 
Low rates could signal low quality training, or that the firm is free-riding on the training by 
other local employers. 
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A more systematic approach was adopted by Johansen (2000) examining the incidence of 
employer funded transferable training in Norway as a function of the ability of firms in 
different sectors to act collectively. Transferable skills have many of the attributes of public 
goods: other employers cannot be prevented from using them, they are non-excludable, and 
in the long run, a strong demand for such skills may stimulate increased supply, they are non-
rival. Johansen then applies Olson’s (1971) theory of how group structure affects the capacity 
for collective action to mitigate free-rider effects (Figure 7). Accordingly, employers can 
more easily work together to provide employer-funded transferable training, when they 
possess an effective coordinating body, such as an employers’ association, and when the 
group is characterised by a small number of large employers capable of coordinating among 
themselves. Cross-tabulating these two characteristics, Johansen identified four sectors of the 
Norwegian economy: two where membership of the sector was dispersed, engineering which 
was dominated by small firms, and schools, and two where membership was concentrated: 
private insurance, where a small number of large firms could provide leadership, and county 
hospitals. Schools and hospitals were members of coordinating bodies, unlike engineering 
and insurance (Figure 6). As Olson’s theory predicted, engineering employers had the 
greatest difficulty to coordinate action over training, whereas the other three benefited from 
either large-firm leadership or well-functioning coordinating bodies. Thus, Johansen was able 
to show how the nature of the groups of employers in different sectors affected their capacity 
to resolve the prisoner’s dilemma and coordinate to train for transferable skills.  
 
 
Figure 6: Group structure and coordination capabilities 
 
Based on: Johansen (2000). 
 
In the case of firm-specific skills, the nature of employer collective takes on a different 
nature. As the worker investments required increase, so does their vulnerability to a hold-up 
by the employer. For this reason, an established norm of long-term employment has co-
evolved with this kind of work system encouraging workers to invest in such skills (Koike, 
1997). Appelbaum and Batt (1994) argue that firms with innovative HR policies that require 
such investments are exposed to similar pressures to those for transferable skills, but they 
also face a problem of credibility with their own employees, which makes individual 
employer action more difficult to sustain. They are much easier to uphold when most of the 
firm’s peers follow the same policies, especially when the resulting obligations are not 
contractual. This is partly a question of peer norms, but also because promises of employment 
security are only put to the test during times of crisis when the firm forgoes short-term 
protection of profits in order to honour its commitments.
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 For an individual firm, such events 
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occur irregularly. On the other hand, if the norm is widely observed, the number of occasions 
when firms maintain long-term employment despite financial stress is greatly increased. If 
one firm were seen to renege on its promise, there is a cost to its peers as it undermines the 
credibility of their promises to their own employees. Thus, as with transferable skills, there is 
also a potential collective problem for investment in the more flexible types of firm-specific 
skills. The capacity of Japanese firms to mobilise informal inter-firm links to coordinate 
action has been widely observed (see for example Cole, 1989). 
c) Employment protection and worker investments in skills  
Different types of employment protections may favour the development of different types 
of skills. Estevez-Abe et al., (2001) set out from similar assumptions to those of Becker, but 
they focus on the security factors affecting workers’ willingness to invest in skills, and 
notably their income and employment security. They argue that firms need to insure workers 
against some of these risks if they are to engage in skill formation, and develop a typology 
shown in Figure 7.
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 They enrich Becker’s model by considering different types of 
transferability and specificity, and use of public educational institutions as well as workplace 
training. Where training quality is certified by educational institutions, workers or the state 
bear much of the cost, and skills are easily marketable. There is no burden of trust on 
employers, and so less need to tie their hands over job security and transferability makes for 
less demand for unemployment protection, as in the US model. In contrast, in Japan, where 
skills are strongly firm-specific, firms have maintained employment protection to encourage 
workers to share the cost and engage in on-the-job training, but firms may be less keen on 
income protection during unemployment as that raises the replacement wage and may favour 
quits. Where skills are transferable within an industry, this attribute reduces the need for 
employment protection, because there is a ready supply of alternative jobs, and mobility can 
be favoured by high income protection during unemployment, as in Denmark. In the hybrid 
case of Germany, the authors argue that employment protection is needed to encourage 
worker investment in upper-tier specific skills, and that within industry mobility also 
generates a demand for income protection during unemployment. In each case, the authors 
argue that the protective framework chosen stems from the joint concerns of both parties. 
 
Figure 7. Skill types and employment protection 
 
 
Based on: Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001: 154 
 
Apart from the evidence examined by these authors, their findings have additional support 
from two European studies of the diffusion of modern forms of team and learning work 
organisation which confirms the link between the more skill-intensive learning model and 
supporting labour market institutions of the kind just discussed (Lorenz and Valeyre, 2005, 
and Holme et al, 2010). 
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d) Risk sharing among employers to encourage labour flexibility  
Much of the debate about social insurance has been dominated by the idea that it has been 
imposed on firms, and creating a form of de-commodification of labour by reducing workers’ 
dependency upon labour market income (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Nevertheless, as Mares 
(2001) has shown, employers also may derive considerable benefits from the operation of 
social insurance systems. These are all the more important given the evidence about 
systematically biased attitudes to risk discussed earlier. By insuring their employees against 
certain work-related risks, employers find it easier to induce them to undertake certain types 
of work, to invest in certain types of skills, and to engage more fully with the firm’s 
objectives, provided benefits are in alignment with firms’ incentive systems. Firms may also 
benefit from insurance of employee incomes against the costs of industrial restructuring, 
including active labour market policies to assist retraining, as it can reduce opposition to such 
measures, and so facilitate economic change. This was indeed the philosophy of the 
redundancy compensation agreements and laws of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Reynaud 
1969).  
 
Mares (2001) proposes a model in which employers invest in social insurance systems 
according to the degree of redistribution of risks, and the level of control or oversight that 
they are able to exercise. In Figure 8, the degree of risk distribution of a policy is shown on 
the horizontal access, and the degree of employer control, on the vertical axis. The inverted 
U-curve traces out the maximum degree of control available to employers consistent with 
different levels of risk redistribution. At very low levels of risk redistribution, there is no 
insurance and hence no employer control, and at very high levels of risk redistribution, for 
example state universal benefits, there is no employer control. The peak of employer control 
is consistent with policies that involve a small amount of risk redistribution, for example, 
within a narrowly defined occupation or for a small group of firms, and in which employers 
can exercise a high degree of control over costs and the design of benefits. The space beneath 
the curve represents the viable combinations of employer control and risk redistribution of 
schemes. Enclosed within the curve, at low levels of employer control, and with increasing 
levels of risk redistribution, Mares lists a progression from an absence of insurance, through 
assistance, the contributory Ghent system, to universal benefits. Systems giving higher levels 
of employer control include contributory insurance which may be targeted to cater for 
varying degrees of risk redistribution, and firm-based schemes and early retirement which 
may be subsidised by varying degrees of risk redistribution to other employers or the state.  
 
Mares argues that employers are interested in control for two reasons: cost control, and 
because they want social policy to be consistent with their own reward systems. Thus, 
employers of highly skilled labour are likely to want control in order to ensure that benefits 
and protection are earnings-related, and do not result in a compression of total rewards 
between skilled and unskilled workers. On the other hand, when their workforce is primarily 
unskilled, risk redistribution is of more use to them than control. Employers may also be 
concerned about risk redistribution, because some forms of employment are more exposed to 
the insured risks than others. In the historical examples Mares provides, sectors with a low 
risk of industrial accidents were reluctant to share risks with those with a high rate of 
accidents, and those with stable product markets were reluctant to share unemployment 
insurance with sectors that served highly cyclical markets. On the other hand, for the 
employers of highly skilled labour earnings-related insurance provides a double benefit of 
increasing the incentives to invest in skills, and of easing the pressure on laid-off skilled 
workers to take the first, unskilled, job available. 
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Early retirement is a particularly interesting case because of its widespread use in western 
Europe to enable firms with many older workers to restructure while redistributing the cost 
more widely to other employers and to the state (Palier and Thelen, 2010). An unintended 
consequence has been the resulting budgetary squeeze on other forms of public expenditure 
highlighting, and potentially exhausting, the limits of the capacity of the state and social 
insurance to underpin concerted action between unions and employer organisations, giving 
rise to what Streeck has called the long-term ‘self-undermining’ tendency of social 






















To conclude this section, the provision of skills in an economy inevitably involves risky 
investments by firms and workers, and given the evidence on systematic biases in the 
appreciation of risks, confronting these on an individual level is likely to lead to an under-
supply especially of sophisticated transferable and firm-specific skills. Each of the selected 
areas in this section, training quality, the distribution of its costs, the need for inter-employer 
coordination, employment protection and social insurance provision, has sought to highlight 
the role of collective action, that is coordination among employers and workers to avoid 
potential market failures. The section has also shown that collective solutions are not always 
available, for example, when group structures, as in the Norwegian engineering sector, do not 
favour coordination. On numerous occasions also, Thelen (2004, 2014) has highlighted the 
historically specific nature of the various national institutions, and Palier and Thelen (2010) 
and Streeck (2009) have warned of the dangers ‘over-loading’ of these institutions as they 
also create potential free-rider problems, for example, over-use of early retirement payments 
to facilitate economic restructuring. In the next section, these institutions are examined as 
‘composite actors', capable of assuming different functions according to the interests and 
needs of their members, but also often needing to find compromise between the competing 
demands of different groups among their membership. 
Control 
Risk redistribution 







7.  Unions and employers as composite actors  
Like Manchester United mentioned earlier, individual unions and employers are 
organisations pursuing their objectives, but to carry out their functions in the arenas in which 
they are active, they need to take on an institutional mantle that ensures the capacity to 
undertake certain kinds of actions on behalf of their constituents, and to enter into certain 
types of agreements. To be allowed to engage in collective bargaining, for example, in most 
countries, employment law requires that unions be independent of the employer, and that the 
employer should refrain from actions intended to undermine this. In most continental 
European countries, there is a functional division between works councils elected by a firm’s 
employees, and unions that depend upon recruiting members from many workplaces. 
Generally, the former engage in conjunctive bargaining over productivity related issues, 
whereas distributive bargaining over pay is assigned to the unions. The former brings a peace 
(no-strike) obligation, whereas for the latter both unions and employers are at liberty to 
engage in strikes and lock-outs. John Dunlop’s (1944) path-breaking work on the economic 
analysis of collective bargaining set the mould for much subsequent theorising built around 
three key actors, unions, individual employers and the public authorities, and their respective 
objectives, but it was heavily influenced by the New Deal framework of the US. Company-
level bargaining favoured the transposition of monopoly bargaining theory to industrial 
relations. It was a model that never fitted the division of labour among European 
representative institutions where collective bargaining has been organised at industry level 
between industry-level employers’ associations and unions seeking agreements to cover 
many different firms. In much of continental Europe this meant that industry bargaining 
acted, according to Streeck’s observation, to take certain issues ‘out of competition’ between 
member firms. Thus, competing on low wage costs and minimal training budgets may be an 
option for individual employers under the US model, but it is largely foreclosed under strong 
forms of industry bargaining. This is not to ignore current debates among observers of 
German industrial relations concerning the erosion of industry bargaining in Germany, and 
changing balance between unions and works councils (Hassell, 2014). 
 
When Scharpf (1997) argues that unions and employers are composite actors, he was 
challenging the view that the union and the firm might be considered as unitary actors as in 
Dunlop’s bargaining model, and as used subsequently by many labour economists. He was 
stressing the manner in which institutional arrangements structure these collective actors and 
their capabilities. He was arguing also that their actions were constrained by the ‘rules of the 
game’, and that these were known to both parties. One could therefore legitimately analyse 
their choices using elements of game theory, but informed by the institutional constraints and 
capabilities affecting them. The background to his work is provided by neo-corporatist 
analysis of peak-level collective bargaining and coordination, and its significance to the 
present context can be best understood by starting from that stream of research. It also 
provided the intellectual background for the subsequent work on ‘varieties of capitalism’.  
 
The early work on corporatism and wage bargaining is best represented by Calmfors  and 
Driffill's (1988) model of the relationship between bargaining centralisation and coordination 
on the one hand, and the trade-off between inflation and unemployment on the other. These 
authors envisaged an inverted U-shaped relationship between centralisation and the 'Okun 
index' of economic misery (the sum of a country’s inflation and unemployment rates: Okun, 
1981: Ch 8). In brief, the underlying theory was that decentralised bargaining at company 
level placed maximum responsibility for any adverse cost and employment consequences on 
local managers and union representatives. Once unions and employers begin to group 
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together in their respective organisations, a collective action problem emerges. Higher levels 
of organisation bring greater bargaining power and drive a wedge between excessive claims 
or concessions and their negative impact on employment and sales. It is only when 
bargaining is centralised that both sets of bargainers once again face the full economic 
consequences of their actions, and have the capacity to coordinate to avoid them. Hence, 
Calmfors and Driffil argue, intermediate levels of organisation experience the worst 
outcomes of inflation and unemployment. Centralised bargaining also increases the scope for 
coordination with government economic policy, and this occasioned the analyses of scholars 
such as Scharpf (1997) applying game theory by analysing the pay-offs to each party, but also 
their respective constraints, in a three-way interaction. If their electors and central banks 
permit, governments can choose between redistributing the costs of excessive pay bargains 
by means of permissive macro-economic policy which may increase the Okun index, and 
tight monetary policy which would translate potentially inflationary pay increases into higher 
unemployment thus bringing adverse consequences home to those bargaining over pay (see: 
Iversen, 1999). 
 
With the decline of inflation, interest in macro-economic coordination has gradually 
shifted away from wage bargaining towards collective frameworks for business performance, 
corporate governance, skills, and job flexibility. These developments fall under the banner of 
the socio-economic foundations of different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Storz et al, 2013). The 
authors who contributed to the Hall and Soskice (2001) volume identified two contrasted 
types: liberal market economies, typified by the US and the UK, and coordinated market 
economies typified by Germany and Japan. Although there has been much debate about the 
number of different ‘varieties’ (see Hancké et al., 2007), the Hall and Soskice version has the 
merit of parsimony. In essence, liberal market economies rely more strongly on the use of 
competitive market forces to coordinate economic decisions, and a set of complementary 
institutions governing corporate governance, skill formation, industrial relations, and inter-
firm networks. In contrast, coordinated market economies rely more on collective action 
through organised representatives of business, workers, governments and other stakeholders. 
Neither model has an overall competitive advantage over the other. Instead, each has a 
comparative advantage in different types of economic activities, so the outcome is 
specialisation and trade rather than head-to-head confrontation. For Hall and Soskice, the 
more loosely structured liberal market model is better adapted to activities benefiting from 
disruptive innovation, whereas the coordinated model has a comparative advantage in those 
requiring incremental innovation. The authors document this with a study of specialisation of 
patenting activity in different sectors in the US and Germany: in the US in IT and in 
Germany, in engineering. 
 
At the heart of the concept of ‘varieties of capitalism’ is an idea that institutions can help 
to align the choices of the actors by making certain compatible strategies more profitable for 
them, thus giving rise to mutually reinforcing choices. The consistency of these strategies is 
critical to the genesis of system-wide comparative advantage (see Höpner, 2005, and Crouch 
et al., 2005). This mechanism is well illustrated by Amable et al (2005), and it also enables us 
to return to the earlier discussion of the employment relationship and job flexibility. They 
show how different institutional arrangements favour different strategies. For example, in 
wage bargaining decentralisation favours pursuit of distributive goals, whereas coordinated 
bargaining favours a more problem-solving approach in the workplace, and in corporate 
governance, exposure to short-term financial market pressures favours pursuit of quick 
returns, whereas more concentrated ownership enables investors to monitor managers’ 
performance in greater depth and evaluate harder to measure long-term policies. Figure 9 
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cross-tabulates these and shows their predicted pay-off matrix for the different combinations 
of strategies. In this case, the best outcomes for both parties are provided by decentralised 
bargaining coupled with short-term financial strategies, and cooperative bargaining coupled 
with long-term financial strategies.
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 The other cells mean that one or other party loses out. 
 
Figure 9 Complementarity between industrial relations and financial markets 
 
Based on Amable et al. (2005). 
 
By modelling the strategies of firms and organised labour, Amable and colleagues  are 
also able to explore the conditions under which institutional complementarity might break 
down, leading one or other party to break out of its established relationship. They represent 
the respective long term bargaining strategies of labour and employers in terms of the current 
wage (profit) share and expected future returns, the two expressions on the right hand side of 
the equations below: 
 
Wt =  wt + stWt+1/(1+rw) 
Πt  = (1- wt ) + stΠt+1/(1+rf) 
 
Wt and Πt represent their respective objectives for wages and profits, and wt  and  1- wt  the 
current share of wages and profits. Expected future returns are a function of the discount rate 
r (rw for the unions and rf for the firm), and firm’s survival probability st (which also reflects 
its long-term profitability). Unions will seek the highest current wage share subject to the 
present value of future wage incomes (low values of r imply higher valuation of future 
returns), and the firm’s survival probability. The latter depends on how long investors will 
continue to support it. Inconsistent time frames between labour and investors, where rw and rf 
diverge, lead to instability as the party seeking short-term gains is more willing to sacrifice 
long term gains to get its way. If both parties seek short-term gains the relationship will focus 
on distribution and will be conflictual, and if both seek long-term gains, there can be a 
stronger focus on cooperation and mutual gains, such as those arising from more flexible 
work roles and a more adaptable zone of acceptance.  
The authors give the argument an additional twist by considering relative bargaining 
power - whether cooperation is out of weakness – and the effects of shifts in bargaining 
power, such as might accompany globalisation. They represent this by the distributive shares, 
wt and 1- wt . Thus, if investors switch their objectives towards short-term gains, weak but 
cooperative unions will seek to break out as they see the benefits of cooperation being 
eroded. In contrast, if unions are strong and cooperative, under pressure from investors, 
management will seek to break out. One may also consider the effect of such changes on job-
level cooperation, discussed earlier, as high levels of task flexibility require confidence that 
both parties share the same commitment, manifest in consistent and high values for r and s, 
that is, a long-term orientation to the pursuit and sharing of joint benefits. A hard line on 
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bargaining over shares is likely to be taken as a signal by the other party that short-term goals 
prevail. 
 
It is tempting to think of the pressures from investors as reflecting general and exogenous 
pressures eroding the distinctiveness of the institutional configurations of the two varieties of 
capitalism. On the other hand, a closer reflection on the nature of skills and knowledge and 
their effect on corporate governance patterns suggests forces making for their stability. Aoki 
(2010) argues that governance arrangements have to satisfy the needs of three key actors: 
workers, managers and investors. Under the classical principal-agent model, the principal’s 
discipline over agents resides in the ability to dismiss them and hire substitutes. Aoki argues 
that this characterises his archetypal American firm, the ‘A-firm’. For this to work, the 
principal must be able to hire workers and managers with the requisite skills and knowledge 
from outside. In this model, expert knowledge resides with managers rather than workers. In 
contrast, the research of Cole (1989) and Koike (1997) indicates a common pattern of 
‘distributed intelligence’ in Japanese firms, Aoki’s archetypical ‘J-firm’. Aoki argues that 
learning by joint problem-solving involving both workers and managers leads to the 
development of joint knowledge assets in which the contributions of each are diffused within 
work groups and are interdependent in their application. In his words, they are ‘fused’. As a 
result, substitution from outside is very difficult. It should be said that this form of on-the-job 
skill development is very different from that found in the classic studies of western internal 
labour markets in which specific skills were tied to individual work posts, and problem-
solving was the work of engineers (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Maurice et al 1982). By 
restricting the dismissal threat, fused knowledge assets require a different form of corporate 
governance to avoid a potential coalition between workers and managers against investors, 
and Aoki argues that this is provided by relational contracting and the group structure of large 
Japanese firms. He argues that large German firms practicing the hybrid occupational and 
specific skills model of Franz and Soskice also have to balance the need for workers to invest 
in firm specific knowledge and investor protection, and consequently, the institutions of 
company-level codetermination which involve worker and investor representatives play a key 
role in providing sufficient protection for each party to facilitate cooperation, giving rise to 
his archetypal ‘G-firm’. Following from the previous discussion, one might ask whether 
similar pressures for increased short-term returns would cause firms to break out from  the ‘J-
’ and ‘G-firm’ models. Such pressures appear to lie behind a widely observed segmentation 
within these economies, between sectors for which fused knowledge assets confer a 
comparative advantage, and those for which it either does not, or has ceased to. Thus the 
present author finds that the ‘G-firm’ model and its related representative institutions have 
been more robust in sectors that have corresponded to the German economy’s traditional 
comparative advantage, but has eroded in other less-skilled and service sectors (Marsden, 
2015). 
 
Finally, these models all relate to the classical employment model, but what can be said 
about interest protection in the project-based model with its transient employment 
relationships? As many of these are high-skill ventures between collaborators, project leaders 
and investors, there is a risk that control of skill and knowledge by project leaders and 
collaborators will generate exploitation of investors, thereby discouraging their participation. 
Based on work on collaborations in Silicon Valley, Aoki suggests that in the ‘S-firm’ teams 
of collaborators often come together with a project in mind, and then seek finance from 
venture capitalists, in a similar way to university colleagues bidding for research funding. 
Guide posts for the realisation of different stages of the project when additional tranches of 
finance can be released provide some protection to investors against collusion among the 
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project leaders and collaborators. An interesting question is whether the more decentralised 
liberal market economy model provided a more supportive environment for this kind of 
institutional innovation. 
 
8.  Conclusion: labour markets as social institutions 
A good deal of recent debate about the nature of economic institutions, for example in the 
Socio-Economic Review, has been distinctly ‘macro’, focused on different ‘varieties of 
capitalism’, looking especially at the institutional frameworks that underpin them. This 
chapter has taken a different approach, starting from the ‘micro-foundations’, building on the 
role of institutions in the two central activities of labour markets: transactions and 
transformation. This approach opens the way for a more direct engagement with the 
analytical tools used by economists. At the same time, it makes way for a more ‘actor-
centred’ approach which has been gaining ground among economic sociologists. Together, 
these enable one to understand better how macro processes build up from the choices and 
decisions of individual actors, but which reflect both their interests, and the norms of 
exchange, the rules, which they choose or are obliged to follow. Reflecting on these interests 
makes it possible to build on the advances in our understanding of human behaviour in 
economic transactions, notably in relation to reciprocity and risk, and to see how the adoption 
of certain ‘rules of the game’ can foster the first, and mitigate some behavioural 
consequences of the second. This opens up a richer palette for our understanding of collective 
action. 
 
Although the ‘weak’ sense of institutions has demonstrated its usefulness by providing 
parsimonious explanations of how social rules, such as the not-undercutting norm, may 
emerge out of decentralised interaction among individual agents, aguably, it assumes too 
much, by relying purely on calculation of the parties’ immediate self-interest. As North 
observed, the knowledge that one’s partners in transaction or transformation will follow 
certain rules greatly simplifies the task of cooperation. If agents know that positive 
reciprocity is a widely respected norm, then they can more readily engage in ‘tit-for-tat’ 
cooperation than if they have to calculate continuously whether or not it is still in the other 
party’s interest. Institutional rules rely on more than a balance of self-interest. They involve 
an element of obligation. Keeping one’s promises, and contracts, is a key norm of exchange. 
If people kept their promises only when it was in their interest, the institution could not 
function, yet we observe that it is a very widespread practice.  
 
There is another limitation of the weak sense of institution, namely that reliance on 
calculation of self-interest leaves little room for reasons of the kind given when an agent 
invokes ‘context C’. The reason why employees should follow their managers’ instructions is 
that they have a contract of employment. The context is different for a self-employed worker 
whose contract does not admit such actions. Giving reasons is also a key component of voice 
relationships. The boss can explain to the employee that task A has now become the more 
profitable one and that it is in their joint interest to switch their effort to that one. The 
employee can explain refusal to undertake Task C pointing out that it is not part of the job, 
and it is not necessary to issue an immediate threat to quit. Context also plays an important 
part in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler’s study of fairness constraints on maximising 
behaviour. For example, presenting a cut in the wage offered as relating to incumbent 
employees as opposed to lesser wage offers to new hires evoked different responses from 
their sample: the first was predominantly judged unfair, the second, mostly acceptable. 
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A final limitation of the self-interest calculus arises from the inherent difficulty that 
Gibbons and Henderson identify with breach in an employment relationship: its flexibility 
often makes breach very ambiguous. Context also enables one to judge more easily whether 
actions are in good or in bad faith, and to identify the ‘trigger’ situations for unleashing 
punishment strategies. Relying solely on individual perceptions and punishment strategies to 
sustain the balance of the relationship is very risky. Allowing small and persistent breaches to 
accumulate may benefit the transgressing party, and encourage further breach. It may also 
influence the norms governing the exchange as what is tolerated can become ‘normal’. 
Explaining a decision in relation to its context – ‘we had to assign you exceptionally to task C 
because of a production emergency’ helps the other party to assess whether it is in good faith, 
before considering whether any action should be taken. Treating norms of exchange as rules 
that are expected to ‘trump’ immediate self-interest, and considering seriously the role of 
context in determining their application enriches the palette of tools available to understand 
the role of institutions in the transactional and transformational processes associated with 
labour markets. In particular, they open the way for a fuller consideration of labour markets 
as social institutions.  
 
Karl Polanyi’s (1944) Great Transformation has played a defining role in the recent 
growth of socio-economics, and in particular, his idea of a double movement, of an 
oscillation between greater freedom for markets and greater protection of the social fabric in 
which their actors are embedded (Krippner, 2004). Such movements are visible in the 
‘commodification’ and ‘de-commodification’ of labour in different labour markets: the 
growing precarity of employment in some sectors, and the maintenance of long-term 
employment in others. Polanyi argued that the political and economic chaos of inter-war 
Europe was the fruit of having allowed the pendulum to swing too far towards self-regulated 
markets in the preceding decades. Stiglitz, in his preface to Polanyi’s 2001 edition, warns that 
markets can require greater and faster price and wage adjustments than the social fabric can 
bear. The social norms that underpin labour markets and employment change, but often 
gradually, as do the coping strategies that workers develop to deal with uncertainty. Given 
their importance in simplifying transactions and transformation activities, the risk of 
imposing over-rapid change is that it leads not to a world of great flexibility, but one that 
Durkheim described as ‘anomie’: normative breakdown accompanied by a breakdown of the 
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10.  Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 The author would like thank Bruce Kaufman for many helpful suggestions along the way, and also participants 
at the 2015 SASE conference for their comments and suggestions. 
 
2
 See Smith 1786, Book V, ch 1 part 3. I am grateful to Saul Estrin for pointing this out to me. 
 
3
 Solow also considers the case where a high equilibrium wage is associated with high unemployment which 
reduces the probability of finding a new job for the unemployed and reduces their chances of benefiting from 
the equilibrium wage.  
 
4
 The difference between the weak and strong senses can be further illustrated by considering the stable 
behaviour patterns in the animal world that led Maynard Smith (1982) to develop his analysis of ‘evolutionarily 
stable strategies’, that is behavioural strategies that will spread and drive out other possible strategies. In his 
example, animals develop territorial behaviour for example for food and mating because these strategies are 
more likely to lead to survival of their species than the alternatives. He considers the ‘hawk’ strategy in which 
an animal will always escalate a conflict to get its way, a ‘dove’ strategy in which it may tussle with the other, 
but will never escalate, and the ‘bourgeois’ strategy which is a hybrid of the two: play ‘hawk’ if you are the 
incumbent against an interloper, otherwise play ‘dove’. Provided that bourgeois players always retaliate against 
interlopers and the cost of escalated conflict is greater than the gain, their strategy emerges as superior to the 
other two. Human beings may also play such strategies, but the point about its robustness in the animal world is 
that it makes no reference to status assignments of the kind emphasised by Searle as an essential ingredient of 




 In an interesting experimental study, Provenzano (2013) shows that employees were more likely to show 
positive reciprocity if their tasks involved a degree of discretion than if they were tightly defined. 
 
6
 In their classic text on industrial democracy, the Webbs (1920) identified two key methods of trade unions: 
collective bargaining and mutual insurance. The first was taken up by scholars such as John Dunlop (1944), who 
was among the first to use the economic model of bilateral monopoly to analyse collective bargaining between a 
union and a firm or an employers’ association. Perhaps because unemployment and sickness insurance were 




 The O*NET data base established by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to support its labour market services 
has built up a description of the detailed work activities associated with each of the nearly 1000 occupations. It 
does this by means of field surveys of managers and workers who not only list tasks but indicate how important 
they are. http://www.onetcenter.org/aboutOnet.html  The O*NET classification is of particular interest because 
it is constructed from field surveys of workers and managers about the tasks comprising their jobs and how 
important they are. It therefore provides a rough image of the zones of acceptance associated with detailed 
occupations in the US labour market. Some of these are core tasks, and regularly undertaken, but others are 
related, and while important to successful execution of the former, are harder to specify and to predict, and 
likely to vary more between workplaces.  
 http://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/DWA_summary.pdf  
 
8
 Simon uses the term zone of ‘acceptance’ implying that it has been agreed, but Barnard (1938) makes the 
stronger claim that workers are indifferent between the tasks within it, and uses the term ‘zone of indifference’.  
 
9
 Deakin and Wilkinson (1998) provide an interesting three country comparison of how small firms can work 
with varying degree of contract incompleteness, and mutual adjustment, depending on the legal framework. 
 
10
 Tolbert (1996: 339) defines a ‘community of practice’ as follows: ‘individuals who actively share a core body 
of tacit knowledge that is necessary for the execution of concrete, everyday work tasks . . . provide the 
foundation for occupations’. 
 
11
 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) argue that an externally recognised qualification is an important incentive for 
workers to engage in workplace general training, as in the German apprenticeship system. See also Höpner, 
(2005). 
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12
 The Japanese labour economists, Shirai and Shimada, argue that the consolidation of Japan’s system of ‘life-
time’ employment occurred during the first oil crisis in 1973-74 when their employees saw the lengths to which 




 ‘Because investment in specific skills increases workers’ exposure to , only by insuring against such risks can 
firms satisfy their need for specific skills’ (p. 181).  
 
14
 Research justifying the corporate governance and financial market side can be found in (Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003), and Aoki and Jackson (2007). 
 
